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INTRODUCTION
In his article,' Professor Hynes makes several contributions to the debate
over the Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA").2 One contribution is
his acknowledgement that both the contractarian and fiduciary-based positions
have merit and respond to socially valuable, although competing, im-
pulses--efficiency and individual justice.' Both are important considerations,
and we should therefore more seriously discuss the costs of both positions.
Another contribution by Professor Hynes is his observation that RUPA is
internally contradictory and does not consistently adopt either position.' The
literature is now replete with critiques of RUPA from both the right and the
left, which amply demonstrate that the uniform act does not meet either side's
objectives.5
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1. J. Dennis Hynes, Fiduciary Duties and RUPA: An Inquiry Into Freedom of Contract, 58 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 29 (1995).
2. REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT (last amended 1994), 6 U.L.A. 280 (Supp. 1995).
3. Hynes, supra note 1, at 31, 43-44, 45-46, 51-52.
4. Id. at 35, 37-38.
5. See, e.g., Claire Moore Dickerson. Is it Appropriate to Appropriate Corporate Concepts:
Fiduciary Duties and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 111 (1993); Hynes,
supra note 1; J. Dennis Hynes, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: Some Comments on the Latest
Draft ofRUPA, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 727 (1992); Larry E. Ribstein, The Revised Uniform Partnership
Act: Not Ready for Prime Time, 49 BuS. LAW. 45 (1993); Allan W. Vestal, Fundamental Contractarian
Error in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1992, 73 B.U. L. REV. 523 (1993) [hereinafter Vestal,
Contractarian Error]; Allan W. Vestal, Choice of Law and the Fiduciary Duties of Partners Under the
Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 79 IA. L. REV. 219 (1994) [hereinafter Vestal, Choice of Law]; Allan
W. Vestal, Should the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1994 Really be Retroactive?, 50 BuS. LAW.
267 (1994) [hereinafter Vestal, Retroactive]; Allan W. Vestal, The Disclosure Obligations of Partners
Inter Se Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1994. Is the Contractarian Revolution Failing?,
36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1559 (1995) [hereinafter Vestal, Contractarian Failing]; Allan W. Vestal, A
Comprehensive Uniform Limited Partnership Act? The Time Has Come, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1195
(1995) [hereinafter Vestal, CULPA].
RUPA participants have done a good job of defending their work. See, e.g., John W. Larson, et al.,
Revised Uniform Partnership Act Reflects a Number of Significant Changes, 10 J. PARTNERSHIP TAX'N
232 (1993); Edward S. Merrill, Partnership Property and Partnership Authority Under the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act, 49 BuS. LAW. 83 (1993); Donald J. Weidner & John W. Larson, The Revised
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Perhaps Professor Hynes's most significant contribution is the suggestion that
the time has come to search for a compromise pursuant to which we can reform
partnership law to respond to both sets of concerns. 6 I agree that we need to
resolve this impasse through compromise.7
To advance the search for a compromise solution, Professor Hynes critiques
RUPA and suggests specific modifications of the statute. Although I find his
critique and proposed modifications unpersuasive, the process of evaluating his
critique and proposal should advance the larger discussion.
The core of Professor Hynes's article is his discussion of the waivability of
fiduciary duties under RUPA. His basic argument is straightforward:
(1) Under the present, UPA-based regime, the fiduciary
obligations of partners inter se are subordinate to the contrary
agreement of the partners (at least arguably, in some jurisdictions).
(2) Under the proposed, RUPA-based regime, the fiduciary
obligations of partners inter se are mandatory and superior to the
contrary agreement of the partners.
(3) The creation of such mandatory fiduciary duties
greatly-and inappropriately, given the underlying policy of
RUPA-restricts the freedom of contract of partners and results
in a diminution of certainty and reliability of partner agreements.
(4) Adequate protections can be provided if the fiduciary
duties made mandatory under RUPA are made default rules and
reliance is placed on contract doctrines, such as unconscionability,
and the nonfiduciary obligation of good faith under RUPA.
I find troublesome each of these four steps. Part II of this response to his
analysis argues that the overwhelming consensus of the cases and commentaries
on the existing regime of partnership law supports the proposition that the
existing fiduciary duties of partners inter se are essentially mandatory, not
default, rules. Part III argues that, properly read, the fiduciary duties and the
nonfiduciary obligation of good faith and fair dealing under RUPA are not
mandatory in any meaningful sense of the word, but rather are essentially
default rules. Part IV challenges on policy grounds the decision favoring the
certainty and reliability of partner agreements over the traditional, fiduciary-
oriented goal of individual justice. Part V questions whether the protections
asserted by Professor Hynes to be found in the good faith and fair dealing
standard in RUPA and the contract-based unconscionability standard would be
Uniform Partnership Act: The Reporters' Overview, 49 Bus. LAW. 1 (1993).
6. Hynes, supra note 2, at 50, 54. In an earlier version of his article, Professor Hynes concluded
that his proposal "may be the best compromise available." J. Dennis Hynes, Fiduciary Duties and
RUPA: An Inquiry Into Freedom of Contract (Feb. 22, 1995)(unpublished draft, on file with Law &
Contemporary Problems).
7. 1 first proposed a compromise solution in 1991. Allan W. Vestal, "Ask Me No Questions and
I'll Tell You No Lies": Statutory and Common-Law Disclosure Requirements Within High-Tech Joint
Ventures, 65 TUL. L. REV. 705, 769-73 (1991).
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an adequate substitute for a true fiduciary regime. The conclusion outlines an
alternative structure for a compromise that could resolve the contractarian-
fiduciary impasse in general partnership law.
II
CONTRACTARIAN PARADISE FOUND? THE MYTH OF DEFAULT FIDUCIARY
DUTIES IN THE EXISTING REGIME
The casual reader of Professor Hynes's article might come away with the
impression that the mandatory fiduciary duties established under RUPA would
change existing law, removing partners from a contractarian state of grace to a
fiduciary state of corruption. Professor Hynes frames the matter by observing:
The issue of defining limits on the power to vary fiduciary duties by contract is not
new. RUPA arguably would change existing law in some jurisdictions. Case authority
exists under the UPA that recognizes the primacy of the partnership agreement, even
when substantial inroads into fiduciary duties are at issue.8
He follows with an extended discussion of two cases, Singer v. Singer9 and
Riviera Congress Associates v. Yassky, ° which he concludes with the assess-
ment that "[a]dopting RUPA would make an inroad into the bargaining
principle established by those courts."'"
8. Hynes, supra note 2, at 41.
9. 634 P.2d 766 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981).
10. 223 N.E.2d 876 (N.Y. 1966).
11. Hynes, supra note 2, at 43. Professor Hynes believes that neither Singer nor Riviera could
withstand adoption of RUPA. I suspect he is wrong, especially if the reviewing court adopts the
confirmatory reading of RUPA § 103(b)(3), see infra notes 47-85 and accompanying text, rather than
the restrictive reading of the section advanced by Professor Hynes, see infra note 46 and accompanying
text. Even under the restrictive reading, the outcomes need not change. Professor Hynes's reading of
Singer is that
[ijn Singer, the duty of loyalty was in effect abrogated by the partnership agreement.
This would seem to call into play section 103(b)(3), which forbids eliminating the duty
of loyalty. Even if the provision in Singer was not found to eliminate altogether the
duty of loyalty, one can easily imagine a court characterizing the language in the
partnership agreement as manifestly unreasonable.
Hynes, supra note 2, at 42. But the Singer court specifically noted that the duty of loyalty was not
completely eliminated by the Josaline partnership agreement, and that partner conduct in violation of
the duty to account, for example, remained actionable. 634 P.2d at 772-73 ("Had [the defendants]
pirated an existing partnership asset or used partnership funds or encumbered Josaline financially, our
decision would be different."). So it is hard to argue the Josaline agreement provision would have run
afoul of RUPA's prohibition of elimination. Nor does it seem likely the Singer court would have
invalidated the provision as manifestly unreasonable. The Singer court, after all, found that the
language of the Josaline agreement
is designed to allow and is uniquely drafted to promote spirited, if not outright
predatory competition between the partners. Its strong wording leaves no doubt in our
minds that its drafters intended to effect such a result .... We construe it to legitimize
and extend free competition between the partners to partnership prospects and
opportunities ....
Id. at 772. It is hard to see why the court would deem the same language manifestly unreasonable.
As to Riviera, Professor Hynes does not argue that the contract provision would run afoul of the
prohibition of elimination, but only that
[o]ne can imagine a court operating under RUPA deciding that a provision such as the
one involved in Riviera is manifestly unreasonable, on the theory that it imposes an
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The casual reader's impression, that RUPA moves partners from a
contractarian world in which fiduciary duties are freely amendable to a fiduciary
world in which they are mandatory, would be understandable even if not
supported by a close reading of Professor Hynes's argument.12  Such an
impression, however, does not survive an examination of the relevant
commentary or case law under the UPA."3 Notwithstanding Singer 4 and
Riviera,5 the body of commentary16 and case authority 7 rejects the notion
unfair risk on the limited partners and operates too much to the advantage of the
general partners.
Hynes, supra note 2, at 43. Perhaps, but the Riviera court does not seem at all hostile to the general
partners; it indicates, after all, that the limited partners had been
fully appraised in the prospectus that the defendant general partners intended to lease
the premises to their own corporation and that such tenant would be capitalized at only
$50,000. This clear statement of purpose has the effect of "exonerating" the
defendants, at least in part, "'from adverse inferences which might otherwise be drawn
against them' simply from the fact that they dealt with themselves.
223 N.E.2d at 880 (quoting Everett v. Phillips, 43 N.E.2d 18, 22 (N.Y. 1942)). This does not strike one
as the language of a court that would easily find the contract provision manifestly unreasonable.
12. Professor Hynes, after all, is careful to qualify his observation: "Case authority exists" from
which it can be concluded that "RUPA arguably would change existing law in some jurisdictions."
Hynes, supra note 2, at 41.
13. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACr (last amended 1914), 6 U.L.A. 1 (1969).
14. Singer v. Singer, 634 P.2d 766 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981). Technically, the Singer court's
observations on the contractual modification of the duty of loyalty are dicta. Although Professor Hynes
simplifies the case to "Josaline brought an action to have the land held in constructive trust for it," in
fact the action was initiated not on behalf of the Josaline partnership, but on behalf of a different
partnership allegedly including the plaintiffs, the Tractenbergs, and the defendants, which was asserted
to have been formed pursuant to an oral agreement by, or on behalf of, the putative partners. Id. at
769. In part II of the opinion, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to prove the existence of the
alleged partnership by the requisite standard of clear, unequivocal, and decisive evidence. Id. at 770-72.
Only after the court makes this finding, which could have been dispositive of the action, does the
opinion consider the effect of the Josaline partnership agreement. Id. at 772-73.
In their partnership treatise, Professors Bromberg and Ribstein suggest another reason to discount
the importance of the Singer decision. They note the "strongly worded provision" in the Singer
agreement, and suggest "[t]he court may reach the same result without an explicit agreement by holding
that the narrow scope of the partnership permitted outside dealings." ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY
E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 6.07, 6:90-:91 (1994).
15. Riviera Congress Assocs. v. Yassky, 223 N.E.2d 876 (N.Y. App. 1966). Riviera is remarkable
mostly for what it is not. It is not a final denial of the limited partners' claims; it is simply a finding that
summary judgment in their favor is not warranted. Id. at 880. Nor is Riviera an endorsement of broad
contractual modifications of the fiduciary duty against self-dealing. The Riviera court's actual statement
of the law is that "if the asserted self-dealing was actually contemplated and authorized, it would not,
ipso facto, be impermissible and deemed wrongful." Id. This is a fair restatement, in the context of
the Riviera facts, of the existing law that specific acts of self-dealing can be authorized if there is full
disclosure and consent.
The assessment of Riviera by Professors Bromberg and Ribstein in their partnership treatise is
interesting because it notes the limited holding:
In Riviera Congress Associates v. Yassky, a limited partnership case, the court held, relying on
a corporate precedent, that a statement of purpose in the prospectus that permitted self-dealing
had the effect of mitigating the presumption against defendants and so precluded summary
judgment for plaintiffs.
BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 14, at 6:92.
16. Vestal, Contractarian Error, supra note 5, at 524-26. The pre-UPA commentaries treat the core
of the partnership relation, the duties and obligations of partners inter se, as a matter of status, not
contract. Thus, one treatise discusses "the various duties of partners, which are usually contained in
the articles, but which necessarily arise from their connection." JOHN COLLYER, A PRACrICAL
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TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 205 (4th Am. ed. 1853). The fiduciary duties formed the core
of the relationship: "The duty of each partner to exercise toward the others the highest integrity and
good faith is the very basis of their mutual rights in all partnership matters." EUGENE A. GILMORE,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIPS, INCLUDING LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 375 (1911).
Modern, post-UPA commentaries affirm the analysis: "The status of partners as fiduciaries with
respect to the partnership and each other is an established principle of partnership law." J. WILLIAM
CALLISON, PARTNERSHIP LAW AND PRACTICE 12-1 (1993). "One of the most significant aspects of the
partnership relation is its fiduciary character." HAROLD G. REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY,
THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 188, at 278 (2d ed. 1990). Professor Melvin Eisenberg's
two letters, mentioned by Professor Hynes, are additional authority. Letter from Melvin A. Eisenberg
to The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (July 27, 1992) (on file with the author); Letter from
Melvin A. Eisenberg to The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (July 17, 1992) (on file with the
author).
Not even a commentary authored by a prominent proponent of partnership contractarianism argues
that under the present regime the weight of general partnership precedent supports the proposition that
parties are free to enter into a general, contractual modification of their fiduciary duties. BROMBERG
& RIBSTEIN, supra note 14, at pt. 6. The authors start with the general proposition that "[tihe Uniform
Partnership Act serves as a 'standard form' contract, which controls the rights and duties among the
partners in the absence of contrary agreement." Id. § 6.01, at 6:2. From that statement, one might
incorrectly conclude that the authors believe the UPA serves as a fully amendable standard form
contract for the fiduciary duties among partners. The discussion of the fiduciary duties of partners
begins on a traditional note, with the general proposition that "[t]he partners, among themselves, are
fiduciaries," id. § 6.07, at 6:67, and a recognition that "specific duties and restrictions ... are imposed
on the partners by reason of the fiduciary nature of their relationship," id. at 6:67-:68. But the analysis
takes a contractarian turn with the assertion that "[f]iduciary duties are essentially part of the standard
form contract that governs partnerships in the absence of contrary agreement." Id. at 6:68. The authors
finesse the mandatory-default nature of fiduciary duties under the existing regime, id. at 6:73, by citing
only the UPA § 21 obligation to account, which by its terms applies only to "profits derived ... without
the consent of the other partners ...." UPA § 21, 6 U.L.A. at 258. The issue of whether the present
regime has mandatory fiduciary duties that are subject to specific limited waivers, or default fiduciary
duties that are subject to blanket modification, is finally discussed at the end of Bromberg and
Ribstein's treatment. The initial thrust of their analysis is contractarian: "Partner fiduciary duties are
aspects of the 'standard form' of partnership. As with respect to the other rights and duties among the
partners, the partners may alter the standard form fiduciary duties to suit their particular relationship."
BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 14, § 6.07 at 6:89. But the text then speaks of the UPA § 21
consents which are specific in content and undoubtedly enforceable. On the critical question of general
amendments of the "default" provisions, the commentary is equivocal:
Although a partner may retain a benefit where the other partners consented to the
particular transaction or the agreement permitted a certain type of co-partner profit,
an across-the-board waiver presents a more serious question. Because the fiduciary duty
among the partners is so basic a part of the partnership standard form, a court may
interpret an across-the-board waiver strictly and apply even a clear waiver cautiously.
There is some authority for nonenforcement or incomplete enforcement of such
waivers in the corporate and limited partnership contexts....
Despite the corporate and limited partnership authority hostile to broad waivers of
fiduciary duty, such waivers should arguably be enforced in a general partnership where
there is direct and equal dealing between the partners and co-management power, at
least where the waiver is explicit and there are no equitable reasons for nonenforce-
ment in the given case.
Id. at 6:91-:92 (emphasis added, citations omitted). That such general modifications "should arguably
be enforced" is an argument from policy, not precedent. No reference is made to the general
partnership cases and commentary rejecting general, contractual modifications of partners' fiduciary
duties inter se.
17. E.g., Saballus v. Timke, 460 N.E.2d 755 (I11. App. Ct. 1983) (general partnership); Appletree
Square I Ltd. Partnership v. Investmark, Inc., 494 N.W.2d 889, 893 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (limited
partnership obligation to disclose information); Labovitz v. Dolan, 545 N.E.2d 304, 310 (11. App. Ct.
1989) (limited partnership).
Page 55: Spring 1995]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 58: No. 2
that partners exist in a contractarian state of grace as to fiduciary duties under
the UPA.18
III
CONTRACTARIAN PARADISE LOST? THE (PROBABLE) MYTH OF
MANDATORY FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN RUPA
If Professor Hynes creates a mistaken impression as to where partners start
out on the existing fiduciary-contractarian continuum, he also leaves what is
probably a mistaken impression as to where RUPA places partner relations inter
se. He begins, appropriately, by noting that RUPA contains the first express,
general recognition of the fiduciary role of partners,1 9 since the UPA recogniz-
es only one aspect of partners' fiduciary duties and leaves the other aspects to
the common law.2 He also notes the inclusion of a statutory obligation of
good faith and fair dealing.21  Professor Hynes's final point concerns the
waivability of fiduciary duties under RUPA: "the waivability of these duties in
the partnership context, never before addressed by statute, is covered in section
103 of RUPA, which prohibits waiver of the duties described in section 404. ",22
The impression, which is probably mistaken, comes in the final point of
Professor Hynes's analysis: his conclusion that RUPA creates mandatory
It is no answer to the claim that plaintiffs make in this case that partners have the right
to establish among themselves their rights, duties and obligations, as though the
exercise of that right releases, waives or delimits somehow, the high fiduciary duty
owed to them by the general partner-a gloss we do not find anywhere in our law. On
the contrary, the fiduciary duty exists concurrently with the obligations set forth in the
partnership agreement whether or not expressed therein. Indeed . . . although
"partners are free to vary many aspects of their relationship inter se.... they are not
free to destroy its fiduciary character."
Id. (citing Saballus v. Timke, 460 N.E.2d, 755, 759 (1983) (citing HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN &
WILLIAM A. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 267 (1970))).
18. Unfortunately, the reader is only told in a footnote at the end of the discussion of Singer and
Riviera of the existence of contrary authority. Hynes, supra note 2, at 43 n. 72 ("Of course, cases exist
that hold diferrently, refusing to recognize provisions in a partnership agreement that make substantial
inroads into fiduciary duties." (citing Appletree Square I Ltd. Partnership v. Investmark, Inc., 494
N.W.2d 889 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993))).
19. Hynes, supra note 2, at 29-30. A quibble perhaps, but Professor Hynes's citation of my earlier
work is a bit misleading. The cited text refers not to the inclusion of a comprehensive definition of
partner fiduciary duties under RUPA § 404(a), of which I am also critical. Vestal, Contractarian Error,
supra note 5, at 537-45. Rather, the cited language refers to the "rejection of the fiduciary essence of
the partnership relationship in favor of the contractarian premise" through the language of what became
RUPA § 404(e) in the final version of the Act. Id. at 535, 553-55. RUPA § 404(e), 6 U.L.A. at 313
(Supp. 1995) ("A partner does not violate a duty or obligation under this [Act] or under the partnership
agreement merely because the partner's conduct furthers the partner's own interest.").
20. Hynes, supra note 2, at 29 n.3.
21. Id. at 30.
22. Id. at 30. Although he speaks of "duties," Professor Hynes is presumably speaking of both the
fiduciary duties of loyalty and care under § 404(a)-(c) and the nonfiduciary obligation of good faith and
fair dealing under § 404(d). He is also presumably speaking of general waivers, since the UPA does
contain authorization for specific waivers, "the consent of the other partners," in cases of self-dealing.
UPA § 21(1), 6 U.L.A. at 258.
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fiduciary duties. The reality is much more complicated. 3 Professor Hynes
divides the universe of duties under section 404 into two parts: those duties that
are "mandatory" and those that are "default rules.,24 According to Professor
Hynes, "[i]f a rule is intended to apply regardless of the agreement of the
partners, it is 'mandatory'." '  Nonmandatory rules, which "can be changed by
agreement of the partners," are "default rules."26 As Professor Hynes reads
it, "section 103 of RUPA ... prohibits waiver of the duties described in section
404."27 Thus, he concludes, "all fiduciary duties and the duty of good faith and
fair dealing are classified as mandatory duties."'
Since "the waivability of duties owed by partners to each other ... is the
primary focus of [his] article,"2 9 it is unfortunate Professor Hynes doesn't
explain the provisions on waiver more fully. His discussion of the waiver
provisions misses an important interpretive dispute regarding just how
impervious to alteration the "mandatory" fiduciary provisions of RUPA truly
are. The character of these provisions depends, in part, on whether one adopts
a "restrictive" or a "confirmatory" reading of section 103(b). Under a
restrictive reading, the mandatory fiduciary provisions of section 103(b) appear
quite formidable since any categorical modifications are subject to a "manifestly
unreasonable" test. The confirmatory reading is less formidable since it allows
broad modifications without reference to the "manifestly unreasonable" test.
The confirmatory reading is supported by both the organizational structure and
text of RUPA, and by its drafting history.
A. The False Dichotomy between Mandatory and Default Fiduciary Duties
under RUPA
As an initial matter, the text of RUPA does not use the "mandatory" and
"default" nomenclature adopted by Professor Hynes, much less the definitions
of those terms he advances.3" Strictly speaking, section 103 differentiates
23. Professor Hynes is not alone in this error. See Mark S. Kende, Shattering the Glass Ceiling: A
Legal Theory for Attacking Discrimination Against Women Partners, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 17, 54-55 n. 156
(1994) ("Vestal's view that RUPA substantially weakens the fiduciary duties of partners is incorrect,
especially since RUPA makes the good faith duties of partners mandatory and permits partners to bring
actions at law."); Michael L. Keeley, Note, Whose Partnership is it Anyway?: Revising the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act's Duty-of-Care Term, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 609,615 n. 33 ("'Mandatory terms'
are synonymous with 'nonwaivable provisions.' In the partnership context, this includes the duty of
good faith and fair dealing. Mandatory terms cannot be contracted around no matter how honestly the
parties desire it." (citing RUPA § 103(b)(5), 6 U.L.A. at 288 (Supp. 1995))).
24. Hynes, supra note 2, at 34.
25. Id. at 34 n.19.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 30.
28. Id. at 34.
29. Id. at 31.
30. As Professor Hynes correctly observes, the mandatory and default labels are used in the official
commentary. Id. at 34 n.19 (citing RUPA § 103 cmt. 1 (1994)). The Reporters were careful, however,
to tie the "mandatory" label to sections that "cannot be waived or varied by agreement beyond what
is authorized." RUPA § 103 cmt. 1, 6 U.L.A. at 288 (Supp. 1995)(emphasis added).
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between four different levels of modifications that are permitted, not two levels
as the mandatory-default analysis suggests. As to most RUPA provisions-that
is, those not listed in section 103(b)-the parties are free to amend the statutory
provisions if they wish. 3' As to those other provisions that are listed in section
103(b), the power of the partners to vary the statutory provisions is restricted
to one of three standards. The strictest standard is where the partnership
agreement may not "vary or "restrict '' 13 specified statutory provisions. The
intermediate standard is where the partnership agreement may not "unreason-
ably restrict, 34 or "unreasonably reduce"35 specified statutory provisions. The
weakest standard is where the partnership agreement may not "eliminate"
specified statutory provisions.36 The only two statutory provisions that fit into
the third, weakest category are the fiduciary duty of loyalty37 and the non-
fiduciary obligation of good faith and fair dealing.38 The parties may not
"unreasonably reduce" the fiduciary duty of care, which thus receives an
intermediate level of protection.39  There is every reason to believe the
drafters knew exactly what they were doing and that the differences in the three
categories are not accidental. There is also every reason to believe, as do the
drafters, that the prohibition on mere "elimination" leaves the parties free to
agree to a succession of restrictions that stop short-but just short--of total,
formal elimination of the statutory provision while providing for its complete
practical elimination.'
Loyalty, good faith, and fair dealing are not even "mandatory" within
Professor Hynes's own definition. Under his analysis, "[i]f a rule is intended to
apply regardless of the agreement of the partners, it is 'mandatory.'.... But
neither the duty of loyalty nor the obligation of good faith and fair dealing is
intended to apply "regardless of the agreement of the partners," since in both
31. Id. § 103(a), 6 U.L.A. at 288.
32. Id. § 103(b)(1), 6 U.L.A. at 288 ("partnership agreement may not ... vary the rights and duties
under Section 105," with specified exception); id. § 103(b)(6), 6 U.L.A. at 288 ("partnership agreement
may not... vary the power to dissociate as a partner under section 602(a)," with specified exception);
id. § 103(b)(7), 6 U.L.A. at 288 ("partnership agreement may not ... vary the right of a court to expel
a partner in the events specified in section 601(5)"); id § 103(b)(8), 6 U.L.A. at 288 ("partnership
agreement may not ... vary the requirement to wind up the partnership business in cases specified in
section 801(4), (5), or (6)").
33. Id. § 103(b)(9), 6 U.L.A. at 288 ("partnership agreement may not ... restrict rights of third
parties under this [Act]").
34. Id. § 103(b)(2), 6 U.L.A. at 288 ("partnership agreement may not... unreasonably restrict the
right of access to books and records under section 403(b)").
35. Id. § 103(b)(4), 6 U.L.A. at 288 ("partnership agreement may not... unreasonably reduce the
duty of care under section 404(c) or 603(b)(3)").
36. Id. § 103(b)(3), 6 U.L.A. at 288 ("partnership agreement may not ... eliminate the duty of
loyalty under section 404(b) or section 603(b)(3)"); id. § 103(b)(5), 6 U.L.A. at 288 ("partnership
agreement may not ... eliminate the obligation of good faith and fair dealing under section 404(d)").
37. Id. § 103(b)(3), 6 U.L.A. at 288.
38. Id. § 103(b)(5), 6 U.L.A. at 288.
39. Id. § 103(b)(4), 6 U.L.A. at 288.
40. Vestal, Contractarian Error, supra note 5, at 559 n.155.
41. Hynes, supra note 2, at 34 n.19.
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cases the partners can, through their agreement, make fundamental changes in
the statutory provision. Under even the most restrictive reading, the parties
may make categorical modifications of the duty of loyalty that are not
manifestly unreasonable,42 may reduce the duty of care as long as the reduction
is not unreasonable,43 and may define the standards by which the obligation of
good faith and fair dealing are to be measured, if such standards are not
manifestly unreasonable." Under Professor Hynes's test, the only truly
mandatory rules are those that the parties cannot "vary" or "restrict."45
If section 103(b)(3) simply read "[t]he partnership agreement may not...
eliminate the duty of loyalty under section 404(b) or 603(b)," the use of
"eliminate" and the contrast with the treatment of other sections would end the
inquiry. The complicating factor, however, is that the section goes on:
The partnership agreement may not...
(3) eliminate the duty of loyalty under Section 404(b) or 603(b), but:
(i) the partnership agreement may identify specific types or
categories of activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty, if
not manifestly unreasonable; or
(ii) all of the partners or a number or percentage specified in the
partnership agreement may authorize or ratify, after full disclosure
of all material facts, a specific act or transaction that otherwise
would violate the duty of loyalty. ... '
How should the two subsidiary clauses be interpreted? The first question
is how the "manifestly unreasonable" language operates. There are two distinct
possibilities: a restrictive reading and a confirmatory reading. Professor Hynes
and others seem to adopt what I will call a restrictive reading of the section.
They evidently believe that the "manifestly unreasonable" standard is a
restriction on all modifications of the fiduciary duty of loyalty and the obligation
of good faith and fair dealing. Thus, they would paraphrase the relevant duty
of loyalty language as:
The partnership agreement may not vary the duty of loyalty under
section 404(b), but the partnership agreement may identify specific types
or categories of activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty, if not
manifestly unreasonable, and the partnership agreement may establish
a mechanism for less than unanimous specific waivers.
Under such a reading, the "manifestly unreasonable" qualifier becomes critically
important, and it makes sense, from the contractarian perspective, to try to
weaken the formulation by moving to an unconscionability test. The alternative
reading, which I will term the confirmatory reading, is that the "eliminate"
language of the initial part of section 103(b)(3) means what it says, and that the
subsidiary clauses merely confirm and regulate two important ways in which the
42. RUPA § 103(b)(3)(i), 6 U.L.A. at 288.
43. Id. § 103(b)(4), 6 U.L.A. at 288.
44. Id. § 103(b)(5), 6 U.L.A. at 288.
45. Id. § 103(b)(1), (6), (7), (8), (9), 6 U.L.A. at 288.
46. Id. § 103(b), 6 U.L.A. at 288.
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power of modification may be exercised. The confirmatory reading of the
section could be as follows:
The partnership agreement may not completely eliminate the duty of
loyalty under section 404(b), although it may make changes short of
complete elimination. The partnership agreement may identify specific
types or categories of activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty, if
such categorical exceptions are not manifestly unreasonable, and may
establish a mechanism for less than unanimous specific waivers.
B. The Textual Argument for a Confirmatory Reading
Which reading, the restrictive or the confirmatory, is correct? In all candor,
the language of the statute is not precise, and substantial arguments exist for
both sides. On balance, however, a stronger case can be made for the
confirmatory reading.
First, the confirmatory reading comports better than the restrictive reading
with the underlying organizational scheme of RUPA. As Professor Hynes
observes, the drafters of RUPA clearly endorsed freedom of contract of the
participants-his bargain principle.a Thus, every statutory provision in RUPA,
if not mentioned in section 103(b), is subject to unlimited modification at the
agreement of the parties. It makes sense, then, that as to the exceptions to the
general rule-the provisions as to which the power to modify is restricted-the
statutory restrictions should be narrowly construed so as to maximize the
parties' freedom of contract.48 This is consistent with the confirmatory reading,
which treats the subsidiary clauses of section 103(b)(3) and (5) as noting specific
types of ways in which the duty of loyalty and the obligation of good faith and
fair dealing can be modified short of elimination, but not as limiting the types
of such modifications.
The second argument for the confirmatory reading is that it is more
compatible with the language employed than is the restrictive reading. We start
with the necessary assumption that the drafters meant to indicate substantive
differences by their use of the terms "vary, '49 "restrict, ' 51 "unreasonably
restrict,' 51 "unreasonably reduce,, 52 and "eliminate 5 3 in the parallel subdivi-
sions of section 103(b).' The confirmatory reading honors the drafters' word
47. Id. § 103(a), 6 U.L.A. at 288 ("Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), relations among
the partners and between the partners and the partnership are governed by the partnership
agreement."); Hynes, supra note 2, at 37, 40-41.
48. One would expect Professor Hynes to support this reading: "The drafters of RUPA made an
effort to keep the list of mandatory rules as narrow as possible .... See Hynes, supra note 2, at 34.
49. RUPA § 103(b)(1), (6)-(8), 6 U.L.A. at 288.
50. Id. § 103(b)(9), 6 U.L.A. at 288.
51. Id. § 103(b)(2), 6 U.L.A. at 288.
52. Id. § 103(b)(4), 6 U.L.A. at 288.
53. Id. § 103(b)(3), (5), 6 U.L.A. at 288.
54. This is not to say that the drafters were always careful in their use of terms. Confusion over
nomenclature was evident in the floor debates. For example, the Chair of the RUPA drafting
committee introduced the discussion of the proposal to protect the duty of loyalty from elimination by
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choice; the restrictive reading does not. For the restrictive reading to work, the
word "eliminate" in section 103(b)(3) must be read to mean "vary," a meaning
presumably not intended by the drafters.55
A third argument in favor of the confirmatory reading concerns the
placement of the "manifestly unreasonable" qualification. If the word
"eliminate" means eliminate and not vary, and if, as the restrictive reading
suggests, the manifestly unreasonable qualification was meant to apply to all
modifications of the statutory duty of loyalty, the qualification is misplaced. To
apply to all modifications, the manifestly unreasonable qualifier should modify
"eliminate" and not merely the categorical exception language.56
A related fourth argument in favor of the confirmatory reading arises from
the content of the first subsidiary clause of section 103(b)(3). Under the
restrictive reading, the subsidiary clause imposes a "manifestly unreasonable"
test on all modifications of the duty of loyalty; however, the clause does not
deal in terms of "all modifications." It is cast in terms of partnership agreement
provisions that "identify specific types or categories of activities that do not
violate the duty of loyalty . . . ."" But not all possible modifications of the
duty of loyalty would be cast in terms of "specific types or categories of
activities." For example, parties might desire to limit the duty of loyalty
temporally, such as changing the adverse interest prohibition under section
404(b)(2) by making it inapplicable during the winding up period.5" Alterna-
tively, the parties might desire to engage in nonspecific modifications of the duty
of loyalty, such as eliminating completely the noncompetition prohibition of
section 404(b)(3). The language of the categorical modification clause does not,
by its terms, limit the parties' ability to enter into such modifications which,
after all, fall short of elimination of the duty of loyalty.
C. The Drafters' Intent and the Confirmatory Reading
If the "manifestly unreasonable" qualifier is not intended to be general, as
the restrictive reading would suggest, how does the confirmatory reading deal
with the nonuniformity of having specific categorical limitations, but not other
using the term "nonwaivable." Proceedings of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, Uniform Partnership Act, Proceedings of the Committee of the Whole, July 31-Aug. 6,
1992, at 397 [hereinafter 1992 National Conference Proceedings]. The same characterization was used
by a committee member to describe the nonfiduciary obligation of good faith. Id. at 143.
55. On the other hand, the word "but" does not easily fit the confirmatory reading. If one changed
the word "eliminate" to "vary," the use of "but" would be appropriate. Under the present language,
"and" is more appropriate than "but."
56. This would have been easily accomplished:
(b) The partnership agreement may not: ...
(3) eliminate the duty of loyalty under Section 404(b) or 603(b), but modifications
of such duty may not be manifestly unreasonable, and consistent with such standard:...
(i) the partnership agreement may identify specific types or categories of
activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty, if net naifsfty "-nr ean6bz ...
57. RUPA § 103(b)(3)(i), 6 U.L.A. at 288.
58. Id. § 404(b)(2), 6 U.L.A. at 313.
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modifications of the duty of loyalty, comply with the "manifestly unreasonable"
test? An answer, suggested by a review of the history of the section59 and the
floor debates, is that the discrepancy is the product of a flawed debate on the
floor of the Conference which proceeded from several incorrect assumptions and
resulted in imprecise language being added to the section. It is not a
theoretically elegant argument, but it does resonate with the legislative
history.' We begin by noting that the mechanism that became section
103-with statutory sections subject to modification by the parties unless the
section is included on a list of sections as to which the power to modify is
restricted-was included from the first version of RUPA.6' But the duty of
loyalty was not included in the list until the July 1992 Conference meeting at
which the first "final" version of RUPA was adopted.62 To that point, the
official commentary reflected the drafters' intention that the fiduciary duties
"may be waived or modified in the partnership agreement, since they are not
59. The process of drafting RUPA was long and complex. See Vestal, Retroactive, supra note 5,
at 269 n.10 (tracing history of RUPA and listing drafts).
60. I note that Professor Hynes's reconstruction of the legislative history of the 1992 Commission-
ers' meeting differs from my own. He casts the July 27, 1992, letter from Professor Melvin Aron
Eisenberg as "[a] thunderbolt from Berkeley" which "had a powerful impact on the [National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws]." Hynes, supra note 2, at 36-37. While I
completely agree with the substance of Professor Eisenberg's critiques of RUPA, and wish his analysis
had had a greater impact, I was at the San Francisco meeting in both the plenary sessions and the
committee meetings on RUPA, and my recollection is that the fiduciary duty discussions were not
particularly driven by the Eisenberg analysis. A review of the transcript of the plenary sessions reveals
only three mentions of the Eisenberg letters. At one point a Commissioner asks for the drafting
committee's response to Professor Eisenberg's correspondence, only to be told by the Chair that "the
Committee of the Whole does not have any professor's correspondence on this subject... " 1992
National Conference Proceedings, supra note 54, at 171. Shortly thereafter, another Commissioner
notes the drafting committee is proposing a move from classical notions of fiduciary duty to a default
approach. He observes: "Now, that's a dramatic movement away from traditional notions, and you can
tell how upset various people, including Professor Eisenberg and others who have spoken here, have
been about this." Id. at 175. The final mention is when the same Commissioner notes that Professor
Eisenberg's letter mentions the link between the general partnership law and the law of limited partner-
ships. Id. at 445-46.
A review of the transcripts of the plenary sessions reveals that the nonfiduciary characterization of
the obligation of good faith was the first concern, with the assembly rejecting a move to recharacterize
the duty of good faith as a fiduciary duty. Id. at 141-50. Then the assembly considered the content of
the duty of care and discussed a motion from the floor to add a "manifestly unreasonable" qualifier to
the duty of care. Id. at 159-70. The discussion diverted into the duty of loyalty. Id. at 170-78. The
discussion then returned briefly to the duty of care and the idea of adding a "fair dealing" component
to the obligation of good faith. Id. at 178-80. At that point, the discussion was held in abeyance until
the following day, at which time the drafting committee brought additional proposals to the floor. Id.
The Conference next took these issues up again in the context of RUPA § 103. Id. at 397. The
assembly briefly considered a proposed change in the amendability of the duty of care. Id. at 398-400.
The assembly then considered at great length four amendments of the duty of care. Id. at 426-85. Only
then did the question arise of having a "manifestly unreasonable" qualifier for categorical exceptions
under the duty of loyalty. Id. at 492-501. The Committee opposed the amendment in part because it
would undercut the certainty they desired. Id. at 495. But the motion passed, and the manifestly
unreasonable qualifier was added to the duty of loyalty categorical exceptions. Id. at 500-01.
61. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 4X (Tentative Draft Jan. 9, 1989).
62. AMENDMENTS TO UPA § 103(b)(3) (Revisions Aug. 2, 1992) [hereinafter AUG 2, 1992, RUPA
REVISIONS].
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excepted by section 103(b). '63  At the same July 1992 meeting, the drafters
included categorical modification language, but in section 404, not section 103:
"A partner's duty of loyalty may not be eliminated by agreement, but the
partner[s] may by agreement identify specific types or categories of activities
that do not violate the duty of loyalty."'  To this point, the drafting committee
had not introduced any type of qualification on the right to agree to categorical
modifications, and the confirmatory reading is fully consistent with the proposed
statutory language.65 The "manifestly unreasonable" condition was added at
the 1992 meeting.' But it was not added by the drafters; it was adopted by
the Conference on a motion from the floor in plenary session, and over the
strenuous objection of the drafting committee67 and the ABA representatives
present.68
What can we learn from the floor modification? First, some participants
apparently believed-whether correctly or not is an open question-that
categorical modifications were the only way to modify the duty of loyalty.69
They also believed---correctly-that by using categorical modifications, the duty
of loyalty could be effectively eliminated.7" The problem apparently was that
none of the participants conceived of waivers that would not constitute total
elimination of the duty of loyalty but that also would not be cast in terms of
"types or categories of activities."71 Second, and not surprisingly for an
63. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404 cmt. (Tentative Meeting Draft July 30-Aug. 6, 1992).
64. AUG. 2, 1992, RUPA REVISIONS, supra note 62, § 404(c).
65. Excepting, of course, the transitional "but" which should be "and."
66. 1992 National Conference Proceedings, supra note 54, at 492-501.
67. Id.
68. Vestal, Contractarian Error, supra note 5, at 558 n. 153.
69. 1992 National Conference Proceedings, supra note 54, at 177-78. Dean Donald Weidner, the
Reporter on RUPA, declared, "We do want to enforce the waiver in the initial agreement, at least at
a certain level of specificity." Id.
70. Id. at 170-73, 177-78, 495-96.
71. The following exchange occurred between a commissioner and a member of the drafting
committee:
Commissioner: As I read this section, the partners can delete from the duty of loyalty
as many different categories of activities as they can possibly think of. Is that correct?
Committee Member: If they are categories as opposed to simply the complete duty
itself, yes.
Commissioner: So, we could say that one of the categories is competing with the
partnership.
Committee Member: No.
Commissioner: That's not a category?
Committee Member: It would have to be something like with respect to real estate
transactions.
Commissioner: Okay. So, if I'm in a law partnership, I can say we'll delete from the
agreement the prohibition against competition in the practice of law. You'd say that
I can do that?
Committee Member: That you could compete or you could not?
Commissioner: That I could specifically say I'm going to delete from the duty of
loyalty the prohibition against competing with this firm in the practice of law.
Committee Member: The answer to that would be "yes," that you could have-
Commissioner: So that cuts out the guts of the loyalty obligation.
Id. at 495-96.
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amendment written from the floor of a plenary session, the nuances of the
modification were not carefully considered. The original suggestion was to
delete the categorical modification language and to substitute in its place
language providing that "the duty of loyalty may not be eliminated but you can,
by agreement, determine standards by which the performance is measured so
long as not manifestly unreasonable."72 The drafting committee rejected the
suggestion.73 A motion followed that the categorical modification language "be
amended to include a limitation on the exclusion of categories of activities, to
limit those categories to ones that are not manifestly unreasonable."74 The
committee responded that it did not want the qualification (misstated as an
''unfairly unreasonable test") because the proposed language "would simply
make it subject to too much uncertainty with respect to any type of exclusion
that was drafted."75  "We were trying to make this so as you have at least
some reasonable safe harbor without making it so unindefinite [sic] that it would
create difficulties in terms of being able to give legal opinions and being able
to have some reasonable assurance that a particular exclusion was valid."76
The vote from the floor added the concept, although the specific language was
crafted by the drafting committee.77
The categorical modification language was not moved from section 404 to
section 103 until one year later, with the drafts of July 1993.78 The second
subsidiary clause, which addresses less-than-unanimous authorizations and
ratifications of specific acts or transactions that would otherwise violate the duty
of loyalty,79 first appears, in slightly different form, in a discussion draft dated
December 7, 1993.80 This was apparently prompted by an October 1993 critical
comment from an ABA committee.8 The specific ratification language was
inserted, in its final form, into the draft with the January 1994 draft82 and was
accepted by the Conference at its July 1994 meeting.83 The official commen-
72. Id. at 493.
73. Id. at 494.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 495.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 500-01.
78. REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 103(b)(3) (Tentative Draft July 2, 1993); UNIF.
PARTNERSHIP Acr WITH 1993 PROPOSED REVISIONS § 103(b)(3) (Tentative Meeting Draft July 30-
Aug. 6, 1993) (redlined with changes).
79. RUPA § 103(b)(ii), 6 U.L.A. at 288 (Supp. 1995). "The partnership agreement may not...
eliminate the duty of loyalty ... but ... (ii) all of the partners or a number or percentage specified in
the partnership agreement may authorize or ratify, after full disclosure of all material facts, a specific
act or transaction that otherwise would violate the duty of loyalty .... Id.
80. REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §103(b)(3)(ii) (Discussion Draft Dec. 7, 1993) (partnership
agreement may "authorize or ratify, after full disclosure of all material facts, a specific act or transaction
that otherwise would violate the duty of loyalty").
81. SUBCOMMITEE ON RUPA, A.B.A. SEC. Bus. L., [RUPA] ADOPTED BY [NCCUSL]:
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON RUPA, 4-5, A3-A4 (Oct. 1993) (on file with
author).
82. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 103(b)(3)(ii) (Tentative Draft Jan. 18, 1994).
83. RUPA § 103(b)(3)(ii), 6 U.L.A. at 288 (Supp. 1995).
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tary clearly states that the specific ratification language is intended to "clarify"
existing law and that the provision is independent of the "manifestly unreason-
able" requirement of the preceding clause.8s
What can we learn from the legislative history of the "manifestly unreason-
able" qualifier? The entire debate over the qualifier was flawed in that it
proceeded from the linked assumptions-both incorrect in hindsight-that the
duty of loyalty was protected against changes, not only outright elimination, and
that the duty could be modified only by specific categorical modifications. The
result of the flawed debate was a statutory provision that is internally
inconsistent and imprecise. Given this confusion, the prudent course for a court
reviewing the language would be to adopt the narrowest plausible construction:
the confirmatory reading.
The final argument in favor of the confirmatory reading over the restrictive
reading involves the parallel provision that provides for less than unanimous
consent.8 5 How would one read the consent provision to harmonize with the
restrictive reading of the "manifestly unreasonable" qualifier? If one reads the
word "eliminate" to mean "vary," as the restrictive reading requires, then one
presumably reads section 103(b)(3) without the consent provision to preclude
even unanimous, fully-informed, noncategorical consent. In this scheme, section
103(b)(3)(ii) is the mechanism by which noncategorical consent is authorized,
and the less-than-unanimous provision is merely incidental to the central thrust
of the clause. In contrast, the confirmatory reading sees section 103(b)(3)(ii) as
simply confirming the existence of a way other than ex ante categorical consent
to modify the statutory duty of loyalty short of its complete elimination. Under
this reading, the less-than-unanimous provision is central, rather than incidental,
since it varies the common law rule. Either argument is plausible, but the
language of the clause favors the confirmatory reading.
D. Summation
Where does that leave us? Admitting that the language of section 103(b)(3)
is imprecise and should be changed, however one comes out on the policy issue,
the better reading is that section 103(b)(3) permits broad contractual modifica-
tions of the statutory duty of loyalty, both in type and sweep, as long as the
modifications do not completely eliminate the duty. Within that broad power
to modify, the statute notes two special cases as to which the statute contains
additional provisions. Consistent with the common law rule, categorical waivers
are allowed, but the categories may not be "manifestly unreasonable." In a
84. Id. § 103 cmt. 5, 6 U.L.A. at 288. The initial draft commentary specifically provided that a
specific consent under the clause "is not subject to judicial review under the 'manifestly unreasonable'
standard." RUPA § 103 cmt. 2 (Tentative Draft June 1, 1994).
85. RUPA § 103(b)(3)(ii), 6 U.L.A. at 288 (Supp. 1995) ("The partnership agreement may not...
eliminate the duty of loyalty ... but ... all of the partners or a number or percentage specified in the
partnership agreement may authorize or ratify, after full disclosure of all material facts, a specific act
or transaction that otherwise would violate the duty of loyalty.").
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departure from the common law rule, less than unanimous consent may be
provided for.
I think there is a plausible, even strong, argument that the contractarians got
a better result than they now acknowledge. The parties can agree to the drastic
weakening of the fiduciary duty of loyalty and the nonfiduciary obligation of
good faith and fair dealing. Could the treatment of the "mandatory" fiduciary
duties and the nonfiduciary obligation of good faith and fair dealing of partners
under RUPA be any clearer? Of course it could.86 Could the treatment of the
"mandatory" fiduciary duties and the nonfiduciary obligation of good faith and
fair dealing of partners be any weaker? Of course it could. Those provisions
could be rendered fully amendable; they could be removed from the list of
statutory sections as to which the parties' power to modify is restricted. This is
Professor Hynes's suggestion as to the fiduciary duties,87 if not the duty of
good faith.88 It is also the proposal of other contractarian commentators. 89
But the fact that the RUPA formulation could be weaker does not make the
existing formulation mandatory in any meaningful sense.
IV
THE UNADDRESSED CHOICE: EFFICIENCY OR JUSTICE
One barrier to compromise is that we approach these matters from very
different conceptualizations of the partnership relation. Professor Hynes
believes that "[tihe partnership relationship is most understandably viewed as
a contractual relationship in all of its respects."'  This is a defensible position,
although one with which I strongly disagree. I view the partnership relation as
fundamentally one of status, with contractual bargaining at the periphery. I
suspect Professor Hynes would acknowledge that this, too, is a defensible
position. But Professor Hynes also believes that his position "doubtless reflects
the view of those who enter partnerships, that they can agree among themselves
what they want their relationship to be."91 This strikes me as unlikely based
86. The full contractarian agenda could be achieved by simply deleting RUPA § 103(b)(3) in its
entirety. The confirmatory reading could be incorporated into the section as follows:
(b) The partnership agreement may not:...
(3) eliminate the duty of loyalty under Section 404(b) or 603(b), but modifications
of such duty may be made which do not constitute elimination, including but not by way
of limitation the following.
(i) the partnership agreement may identify specific types or categories of
activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly unreasonable; e, and
(ii) all of the partners or a number or percentage specified in the partnership
agreement may authorize or ratify, after full disclosure of all material facts, a specific
act or transactions that otherwise would violate the duty of loyalty ....
87. "It is the view of the author that deleting the provisions in section 103 that mandate fiduciary
duties would be a logical extension of the bargain principle." Hynes, supra note 2, at 50.
88. Id. at 54.
89. Ribstein, supra note 5, at 57-61.
90. Hynes, supra note 2, at 39.
91. Id.
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on both my personal experience92 and our collective history.93 Of course,
people who enter into partnerships rightly understand many facets of their
relationship to be the subject of negotiation, but I rather doubt that the majority
of partners view the core of the fiduciary obligations inter se to be wholly
negotiable.94  If partners have such contractarian expectations, then the
common law and the existing statutory regime have been seriously out of touch
with lay expectations for a long, long time.
We compound the confusion, and make a compromise less likely, by not
precisely defining the competing values. Professor Hynes, for example, seems
to well define the efficiency-related values his proposal would advance: "the
principle of freedom of contract among partners,"95 and "the ... value of
certainty and reliability of partnership agreements."96 He believes that making
partnership agreements reliable and certain is "a worthy goal," 97 and asks
"[wiho can quarrel with the policy of providing certainty and reliability to
partnership contracts, within the framework of limitations applicable to all
contracts?"98
But what of the competing values? Professor Hynes speaks rather vaguely
of "the value of a definition of fiduciary duties that would leave room for
expansion and reformulation of underlying principles ... , " which, he notes,
"was outweighed by the competing value of certainty and reliability of
partnership agreements." And no wonder; even next to low-intensity values
like certainty and reliability, "expansion" and "reformulation" are hardly the
kind of values that inspire much enthusiasm. But, of course, just as certainty
and reliability are proxies for efficiency, expansion and reformulation are
proxies for individual justice.
It certainly is true that having broad, mandatory fiduciary duties competes
with unlimited freedom of contract and is, at some level, in competition with a
goal of making partnership agreements more certain and reliable. Professor
Hynes notes the effect of the ascendancy of efficiency. He finds the wording of
the fiduciary duty definition "curious" because it confines the description of
92. I was in private practice for 10 years prior to becoming an academic. During that time, I
represented many partnerships, from relatively uncomplicated family partnerships to joint ventures of
very sophisticated high-tech corporations. On the basis of that admittedly anecdotal experience,
Professor Hynes's characterization strikes me as substantially wide of the mark.
93. E.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
94. That some facets of the partnership relation are negotiable is so obvious as to not require
restatement. E.g., UPA § 18, 6 U.L.A. at 213 ("The rights and duties of the partners in relation to the
partnership shall be determined, subject to any agreement between them, by the following rules ....").
But there has always been a clear difference between the business concern of how profits and
management rights are allocated, and the core fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, and good faith. But see
Kende, supra note 23, at 47 n.128 (citing UPA § 18 as evidence that "anti-contractarian" view of
fiduciary duties is incorrect).
95. Hynes, supra note 2, at 31.
96. Id. at 32.
97. Id. at 35.
98. Id. at 33 n.13.
99. Id. at 32.
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fiduciary duty in an artificial way." He notes that the sweep of fiduciary
obligation does not extend as far under RUPA as it does under the existing
regime, eliminating the fiduciary obligation to supply information and cutting
the duty of good faith off from its fiduciary roots to increase the reliability of
agreements. 1'
But these are not simply abstract effects of a desire for efficiency; these are
costs of substantial proportions in terms of individual fairness and justice. Cast
in this way, there are any number of people who quarrel with the ascendancy
of the efficiency goals of certainty and reliability over the fiduciary goals of
individual fairness and justice."
We have not yet really joined, much less resolved, these questions."13 At
the counsel of the contractarians, the Conference proposes to undo the
established fiduciary base of partnership law and substitute in its place an
efficiency-based regime. Such a significant step should not be taken without a
great deal more debate than we have had."° We certainly ought not take
such a step on the basis of the suggestion that no one "can quarrel with the
"3105policy of providing certainty and reliability to partnership contracts ....
100. Id. at 31-33.
101. Id. at 33-34.
102. See Vestal, Contractarian Error, supra note 5, at 539. Commentators have noted the importance
of the language in which fiduciary duties are couched:
[tihe language expressing these [fiduciary] norms is aspirational and studiously
imprecise. The very ambiguity of the language conveys its moral content as the court's
refusal to set lines is designed to discourage marginal conduct by making it difficult for
a fiduciary to determine the point at which self-serving conduct will be prohibited, and
thus to encourage conduct well within the borders.
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675,
1695-96 (1990); see also Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 829-32 (1983); Marleen
A. O'Connor, How Should We Talk About Fiduciary Duty? Directors' Conflict of Interest Transactions
and the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 954
(1993). Professor Deborah DeMott adds an appropriate cautionary note about substituting metaphor
for analysis. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE
L.J. 879.
103. An interesting body of literature is developing that confronts the law and economics infatuation
with efficiency. See Claire Moore Dickerson, From Behind the Looking Glass: Good Faith, Fiduciary
Duty and Permitted Harm, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 955 (1995) (developing permitted harm analysis);
Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules (inappropriate to use fiduciary duties as default
rules) (on file with author).
104. The ABA committee that initiated the partnership law revision effort did not call for such a
basic change. It wanted the new statute "to incorporate the full range of fiduciary duties developed by
the cases (due care, good faith, loyalty, and full disclosure of all material facts)." Uniform Partnership
Act Revision Subcommittee, ABA Business Law Section, Should the Uniform Partnership Act be
Revised, 43 BUS. LAW. 121, 151 (1987). The committee also recommended that "[t]he extent of the
fiduciary duty of a particular partner should be able to be limited (or expanded) by agreement between
the partners." Id. at 152.
105. Hynes, supra note 2, at 33 n.13.
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V
THE ILLUSION OF COMPROMISE: UNCONSCIONABLE CATEGORICAL
WAIVERS AND RELIANCE ON A "MANDATORY" AND NARROWLY
DEFINED OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH
To his credit, Professor Hynes is not inflexible about fixing RUPA.
Although he argues that deleting the "mandatory" fiduciary duties under section
103 would be the logical extension of the bargain principle,'06 he presents a
three-part compromise solution. First, retain the current "mandatory" fiduciary
duties under RUPA.' ° Second, change the categorical waiver standard from
"manifestly unreasonable" to "unconscionable," to better reflect the bargain
principle."°  Third, narrowly define the "mandatory" obligation of good
faith."° This solution, he has suggested, may be the best compromise avail-
able for the efficiency-seeking commentators."0
The problem with Professor Hynes's compromise proposal is that it does not
represent a genuine compromise at all. His first point, and presumably his
primary concession to the fiduciary analysis, is to allow the continuation of the
existing mandatory fiduciary duties, which are neither mandatory nor truly
fiduciary."' His second point is to make the categorical waiver language even
less protective of aggrieved partners. His third point is to rely on what he
erroneously sees as a "mandatory" obligation of good faith, which he proposes
to define narrowly. We have already addressed the first point; let us turn to the
second and third.
A. Categorical Waivers: Manifestly Unreasonable or Unconscionable?
Assume, for the moment, that Professor Hynes is correct that the manifestly
unreasonable test applies to all modifications of the statutory duty of loyalty.
Does it make sense to move to an unconscionability test? The term "manifestly
unreasonable" is not defined in RUPA, and we are given little guidance in the
official commentary. 2 Professor Hynes worries that the phrase invites judges
and juries to substitute their personal "assessment of the reasonableness of a
term" for a more orderly consideration.1 3 The unconscionability test appeals
to him because it has a better developed body of interpretation, and-importan-
106. Id. at 39-46, 50.
107. Id. at 50.
108. Id. at 50-53.
109. Id. at 36-49.
110. Hynes, supra note 6 (concluding his proposal "may be the best compromise available").
111. Vestal, Contractarian Error, supra note 5, at 545-55, 556-63. See infra part 11.
112. RUPA § 103 cmt. 5, 6 U.L.A. at 288 (Supp. 1995). Professor Hynes observes that the term is
not the subject of helpful case decisions. Hynes, supra note 2, at 53 n.110.
113. Hynes, supra note 1, at 51-52.
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tly-because it has a process predicate.114 Professor Hynes candidly acknowl-
edges a final point of comparison:
[Iln addition to the doctrinal distinctions[,] ... one can point to the shock value of the
word "unconscionable" as a point of difference between the two tests .... "U]n-
conscionable" defines a more extreme situation than the milder "manifestly unreason-
able." By doing so, it elevates the stakes and enhances the inquiry. That in turn
accords greater respect to the agreement.'
5
Professor Hynes's proposal should not appeal to either side in this debate
for two of the very reasons for which he favors the substitution. The fiduciary-
based objection is clear. By "defining a more extreme situation," "elevating the
stakes," "enhancing the inquiry," and "according greater respect to the
agreement," Professor Hynes presumably means that an unconscionability
showing would be harder to make than a showing of manifest unreasonableness,
thus affording partners even further diminished protection. In this he is
probably right, and for this reason, fiduciary-oriented commentators, who
already object to the diminution of protection from the UPA to RUPA, should
oppose his proposal.
If the contractarians are worried about the theory involved and are not
simply aiming to set the bar as high as possible, they should be concerned about
the process inquiry involved in application of an unconscionability standard.
The partners' fiduciary obligations extend to the pre-partnership negotiation
phase under the UPA116 but not under RUPA. l1 7 It is inconsistent with the
evolution of partnership law, then, to move to an unconscionability standard
that would look into the negotiation phase.
There is also a process problem concerning how an unconscionability
standard would interact with RUPA section 404(f), the approval of self-
dealing.'18 This could easily arise where a partner transacted business with the
partnership claiming protection of a categorical waiver."9 Another partner
could seek to enforce the duty of loyalty provisions against self-dealing"z and
could challenge the categorical waiver on unconscionability grounds.' The
unconscionability standard is contextual, and the identity of the partner as a
partner is a critical part of that context.122 An unconscionability standard and
114. Id. at 52-53.
115. Id. at 53.
116. Vestal, Contractarian Error, supra note 5, at 529 n.16.
117. RUPA § 404(b)-(c), 6 U.L.A. at 313 (Supp. 1995).
118. Id. § 404(f), 6 U.L.A. at 313 ("A partner may lend money to and transact other business with
the partnership, and as to each loan or transaction the rights and obligations of the partner are the same
as those of a person who is not a partner, subject to other applicable law.").
119. Id. § 103(b)(3)(i), 6 U.L.A. at 288.
120. Id. § 404(b)(1)-(3), 6 U.L.A. at 313.
121. Id. § 103(b)(3)(i), 6 U.L.A. at 288 (modified for this example by substitution of an
unconscionability test for the current statutory manifestly unreasonable test).
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACrS § 208 cmt. a (1979). "The determination that a
contract or term is or is not unconscionable is made in the light of its setting, purpose and effect." Id.
"Some types of terms are not enforced, regardless of context .... Other terms may be unconscionable
in some contexts but not in others." Id. § 208 cmt. e. There are unconscionability cases whose
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the self-dealing provision of section 404(f) could be reconciled in two very
different ways. The categorical approval language, as tied to an unconscio-
nability standard, could put the partner seeking to overturn a categorical waiver
on unconscionability grounds to an unconscionability test that considered his or
her status as partner. In the alternative, section 404(f) could be read to alter
the unconscionability test fundamentally by abandoning the contextual
component and substituting in its place a wholly idiosyncratic and artificial test
using fictional nonpartners. The difference could easily be outcome determina-
tive.
B. Is a Mandatory Good Faith Standard Sufficient Protection?
I suspect Professor Hynes views this component of his proposed compromise
as a trade. The contractarians submit to a mandatory obligation of good faith,
and the fiduciary commentators agree to give up RUPA's open-ended definition
of good faith and fair dealing and submit to a narrow, UCC-based definition.
The initial problem with this view is that the nonfiduciary obligation of good
faith and fair dealing as it exists in RUPA is no more mandatory than the
fiduciary duty of loyalty. The obligation of good faith suffers from the same
questions regarding amendability as the duty of loyalty. As is the duty of
loyalty, the obligation of good faith and fair dealing is listed as a section of
RUPA as to which the parties' power to modify is restricted." As is the duty
of loyalty, the obligation of good faith and fair dealing is protected only to the
extent that the parties may not "eliminate" it,"" and the parties are free to
agree to a specific class of modifications with the requirement that such
modifications may not be "manifestly unreasonable."1" As with the duty of
loyalty, the language of the RUPA provision is imprecise and admits both a
restrictive and a confirmatory reading."2 Regardless of how one personally
resolves the issue, the "mandatory" nature of the obligation of good faith and
fair dealing is far too tenuous to form the basis of a compromise such as that
outlined by Professor Hynes.
The second problem with Professor Hynes's good faith compromise is his
advocacy of a narrow definition of good faith. He is correct that RUPA does
not define the obligation of good faith and fair dealing, electing to leave the
outcomes strongly suggest consideration of the partnership setting. See, e.g., Bohn v. Bohn Implement
Co., 325 N.W.2d 281, 282, 285 (N.D. 1982).
123. RUPA § 103(b)(5), 6 U.L.A. at 288 (Supp. 1995).
(b) The partnership agreement may not: ...
(5) eliminate the obligation of good faith and fair dealing under Section 404(d), but
the partnership agreement may prescribe the standards by which the performance of
the obligation is to be measured, if the standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
Id.
124. Id. § 103(b)(5), 6 U.L.A. at 288.
125. Id.
126. See supra part II.
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development of the law up to the courts.127 He is also correct that this choice
is at odds with certainty."2 His solution, to advance certainty, is to adopt the
general UCC definition of "good faith" as "honesty in fact in the conduct or
transactions involved."129 This desire for efficiency has apparently overridden
Professor Hynes's earlier doubts; he once rejected the UCC definition,
concluding that it "seems too narrow for the variety of situations which the
definition in section 404(a) would encompass."'' " Professor Hynes was not
alone in rejecting the narrow UCC definition; the Conference drafters
considered and rejected a move by the ABA participants to include the
restrictive definition of good faith. 31 If partners are left to rely on the good
faith standard, then that standard ought not be further weakened by adopting
a definition too narrow to deal with the situations one reasonably anticipates
will arise.
A third problem with reliance on the nonfiduciary obligation of good faith
concerns two other RUPA provisions that appear to undermine the good faith
obligation. The first is RUPA's endorsement of self-interest: "A partner does
not violate a duty or obligation Under this [Act] or under the partnership
agreement merely because the partner's conduct furthers the partner's own
interest.' ' 132 How does one reconcile this affirmation of self-interest-which
clearly is intended to trump the obligation of good faith in some situa-
tions-with increased reliance on the good faith and fair dealing obligation?
The second provision is RUPA's approval of self-dealing: "A partner may lend
money to and transact other business with the partnership, and as to each loan
or transaction the rights and obligations of the partner are the same as those of
a person who is not a partner, subject to other applicable law.' 33 The same
type of problem is raised here as with the unconscionability test for categorical
waivers. The problem is that the obligation of good faith and fair dealing is
undoubtedly contextual, and the identity of the partner as a partner is a critical
127. RUPA § 404 cmt. 4, 6 U.L.A., at 313 (Supp. 1995).
The meaning of "good faith and fair dealing" is not firmly fixed under present law.
"Good faith" clearly suggests a subjective element, while "fair dealing" implies an
objective component. It was decided to leave the terms undefined in the Act and allow
the courts to develop their meaning based on the experience of real cases.
Id.
128. Hynes, supra note 1, at 47.
129. Id. ("To minimize the danger of uncertainty, 'good faith' is best defined as it is in Article 1 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, as 'honesty in fact in the conduct or transactions concerned."').
Professor Hynes proposes incorporation of the general UCC definition of good faith, "honesty in fact
in the conduct or transaction concerned." U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1990). It is unclear whether he would
adopt the Article 2 definition of good faith for a merchant, "honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade," id. § 2-103(1)(b), where the partner is
a merchant within the definition of U.C.C. § 2-104(1). This could make a substantial difference in
partnerships where one partner provides capital and another provides expertise in the business of the
partnership.
130. Hynes, supra note 5, at 756 n. 124.
131. Vestal, Contractarian Error, supra note 5, at 549 n. 103.
132. RUPA § 404(e), 6 U.L.A. at 313 (Supp. 1995).
133. Id. § 404(f), 6 U.L.A. at 313.
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part of that context. The basic UCC good faith requirement, which Professor
Hynes proposes to incorporate into RUPA, is a subjective rather than objective
standard." 4 The good faith and fair dealing requirement of RUPA section
404(d), interpreted as the UCC provides, and the self-dealing provision of
RUPA section 404(f) could be reconciled in, two very different ways. The
Revised Act provision could put the knowledgeable partner to the subjective
good faith standard of the UCC, which requires consideration of his or her
status as partner. In the alternative, the Revised Act could be read to alter
fundamentally the UCC's good faith requirement by abandoning the well-
established subjective good faith standard and substituting in its place a wholly
idiosyncratic "reasonable (nonpartner) person standard."'35 The first reading
is more plausible, since the statutory language gives no indication of such a
radical change in existing law. The official commentary is ambiguous.'36
This last problem is illustrative of a more general difficulty with RUPA, the
lack of a consistent answer to the tension between the competing goals of
efficiency and individual justice. Not that RUPA ought to pursue either goal
to the exclusion of the other, but RUPA is frequently unclear, once a balance
has presumably been struck, as to what that balance is."'
VI
CONCLUSION
Where do we go from here? It should be clear that the process has broken
down, that RUPA as it stands is not-and should not be-acceptable to either
the contractarians or those who maintain the importance of fiduciary principle.
It is a measure of how inadequate that process has been that we are debating
this late in the day whether RUPA takes partners from mandatory fiduciary
rules to default rules, or the other way around. It is also a measure of how
134. See Farmers Coop. Elevator, Inc., Duncombe v. State Bank, 236 N.W.2d 674, 678 (Iowa 1975)
("Decisions construing § 1201(19) of the Code overwhelmingly agree that the test of good faith under
that section is a wholly subjective one of honesty." (citing cases establishing subjective standard)).
135. The general contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing is similarly contextual.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1979) (citing U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1990)
(definition of good faith)). In the Restatement (Second) model, "[g]ood faith performance or
enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with
the justified expectations of the other party." Id.
136. RUPA § 404 cmt. 6, 6 U.L.A. at 313 (Supp. 1995).
Subsection (f) authorizes partners to lend money to and transact other business with
the partnership and, in so doing, to enjoy the same rights and obligations as a
nonpartner. . . . The rights and obligations of a partner doing business with the
partnership as an outsider are expressly made subject to the usual laws governing those
transactions. . . . The reference to "other applicable law" makes clear that subsection
(f) is not intended to displace those laws, and thus they are preserved under Section
104(a).
Id.
137. The fiduciary duties illustrate one important point upon which contractarian analysis has failed
to carry the day. Another is the disclosure obligations of partners inter se. Vestal, Contractarian
Failing, supra note 5.
Page 55: Spring 19951
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
flawed the product is that the statute provides no clear direction to partners and
their attorneys on these critical questions.
Professor Hynes searches for compromise. That goal is correct, although his
proffered compromise is really just tinkering with the contractarian failure of
RUPA and moving the regime toward a marginally more contractarian end.
But if we want real compromise to get us out of this awkward situation, there
is a way.38
First, the Conference and the ABA should admit impasse and withdraw
RUPA. As this article is written, the various states are considering RUPA.
They are making fundamental changes in the statute in an uncoordinated and
nonuniform way. Rather than have this breakdown continue, with the resulting
nonuniformity and confusion in the law, and the inevitable resentment when
another uniform act is promulgated in a very few years, the states should be
urged to cease their consideration of RUPA.
Second, RUPA should be rewritten to include two divisions. The first
should be the foundational law of general partnerships. While it could
incorporate large parts of RUPA, and thus take advantage of much of the
valuable work done by the Conference drafting committee, it should differ from
RUPA by being based on a fiduciary model of the partners' relations inter se.
Within that area, it should include a nonexclusive, broad statement of the
partners' fiduciary duties inter se. It should include both the obligation to
disclose relevant information and the obligation to act in good faith as fiduciary
duties. It should apply from the prepartnership phase through winding up. And
its fiduciary duties should be amendable only by written agreements, either
categorical or specific, either ex ante or ex post, but always with full disclosure
of all material facts, and only to the extent not manifestly unfair or unreason-
able, either in isolation or in aggregate.
In contrast, the second division should provide for an opt-in, contractarian-
based modification of key provisions of the first division. Parties could opt in
at any time, but the election would have to be in writing. By opting in, the
parties would be subject to an exclusive, limited statement of the partners'
duties inter se, and no limitation would be imposed on the authority of the
partners to modify the statutory default duties. The opt-in regime would
include reduced default disclosure obligations and restricted temporal
application, both fully amendable. There would be no standards for enforce-
ment of the parties' modification agreements other than the otherwise
applicable contract standards of unconscionability, good faith and the like. To
avoid confusion, business organizations which opt into the contractarian regime
would be designated "statutory joint ventures."
Under such an approach, both sides get much, but not all, of what they
desire. The contractarians get a regime with clear defaults, which follow the
138. This proposal incorporates many elements I have suggested before. Vestal, supra note 7, at 769-
73; Vestal, Contractarian Error, supra note 5, at 578.
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hypothetical cost-free negotiation of contractarian theory, and the ability for
partners to bargain to pretty much whatever end they desire. They get the
measure of predictability and certainty they require, and the efficiency they
crave. The advocates of traditional fiduciary partnership law get a fiduciary
regime for inadvertent partners and for those who do not opt in to the
contractarian regime, with its purposefully broad definitions of duty, its
flexibility to meet new situations, and its capacity to work toward an individually
just result. They avoid the debasement of the partnership concept found in
RUPA. There are also process reasons favoring this compromise. With it, we
may be able to avoid a breakdown in uniformity in partnership law. By linking
limited partnership law to the first division, we could avoid the necessity of
rewriting limited partnership law into a comprehensive, stand-alone statute. 139
Professor Hynes is right that compromise is needed to solve the problems
with RUPA. His analysis and proposed compromise are flawed, but he has
nevertheless made a significant contribution to a much-needed discussion.
139. See Vestal, CULPA, supra note 5.
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